We explore in this paper how trading noise, when considered as a market friction, reacts to trading activity. Transactions cost is a good explanation for intraday trading behavior in the market according to our data. Particularly, we show that in general trading brings friction to market. However, trading friction at market open is the lowest during the day, as trading causes less friction then relatively. This is due to the behavioral difference among investors. When market opens, individual trading removes, while institutional trading brings, market friction. Situation in the rest of the day is just the opposite, where individual, instead of institutional, trading brings friction. The uneven behavior of trading noise across investors and time of day makes it a specific, rather than general, transactions cost, as opposed to Stoll (2000). Intraday trading activity suppresses both order width and depth, as proxies for trading intensity, therefore creates more noise or friction in the market. Width and depth contribute to trading noise in a polarized way, so that individual trading hurts friction in small cap stocks at open, but benefits it at close. Institutional trading brings extremely strong friction to large cap stocks, but less so at market close. So trading noise as a specific, rather than general, transactions cost is prominent only to certain investors, at certain time and for certain stocks in the market. Our findings lend itself to the justification of the new financial transactions tax proposed by the European Union.
I. Introduction
Trading in markets involves general transaction costs applicable to the entire market as well as specific costs only born by certain investors. The former acts as a friction in trading, which could be noises as argued in Stoll (2000) or herding out of information cascades (see Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Banerjee (1992) , Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) and Avery and Zemsky (1999, AZ) , among others). The latter could also take the form of information asymmetry (as discussed in Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) , Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , Kyle (1985) , Admati (1991), Easley and O'Hara (1992) and Easley, Kiefer, and O'Hara (1997) ). This study addresses the role of trading noise as a friction to market participants, especially in the presence of trading concentration. Our interest is in whether trading activity itself adds to or drives down this friction, and how the relationship is affected by investor type, market capitalization of stocks and time of day the trading takes place. If trading brings friction, then our findings provide support to financial transactions tax which encounters much resistance.
We attempt to verify in this study if trading noise really qualifies to be a general transactions cost, or a market-wide friction, in an intraday framework. It has been well documented in Amihud and Mendelson (1987) , Stoll and Whaley (1990) , and Stoll (2000) that stock return volatility is the highest right after market opens. Stoll (2000) suggests that the high volatility is caused by friction, a general transaction cost for everyone in the market. Alternatively, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992, LSV) and Wermers (1999) stress that volatility is closely related to information-induced herding behavior. However, Lin, Tsai and Sun (2011) argue that comparative advantage in search cost dictates a polarization of trading activity across investors, firm size and time of day. Based on that notion, an investor can optimize by allocating trades when transaction cost is the most favorable. Hu (2006) applied a return decomposition mechanism to conclude that specific transactions cost causes the market to be the most volatile at open since frictional noises are the smallest during the day. We adopt this concept but attempt to identify its driving factors.
We find in this study that trading activity brings friction to market. However, friction at market open tends to be the lowest during the day, as trading causes less friction relatively at that time. This is due to the behavioral difference among investors. When market opens, individual trading removes, while institutional trading brings, market friction. Situation in the rest of the day is just the opposite, where individual, instead of institutional, trading brings friction. The uneven behavior pattern of trading noise across investors and time of day makes it a specific, rather than general, transactions cost, as opposed to Stoll (2000) . We also find that noise component of return volatility is stronger when trading is more concentrated, different from the prediction of Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) and Hu (2006) . Although in general the time needed to fill an order, or the inverse of the number of orders matched with a certain time window, is inversely related to trading noise, it is quite the contrary at market open. Moreover, we argue that noise is influenced more by trading concentration, at open than at close. We also find that market width of limit order book, which measures how tightly the orders are placed to each other or how closely they are to the mid-quote, affect trading noise. Market depth exhibits similar influence. Response of noise to market width and depth differs by market capitalizations as well as by trading hours. Individual trading aggravates at open, but benefits at close, friction in the trading of small cap stocks. Despite that institutional trading brings extremely strong friction to large cap trading, it still contributes relatively less to trading friction at market close.
We consider in this study trading intensity more in a dynamic sense by measuring order intensity rather than quantity, with sequences of buy or sell runs based on Patterson and Sharma (2006, PS) . It captures intraday order flows better than the popular LSV method, which is more suitable for longer time frame. The dynamic trading intensity helps us capturing how 'friction' really arises from trades. Although noise proportion of stock returns is high on individual orders and low on institutional orders, its behavior at market open is entirely different from the rest of the day. Noises for small cap stocks, unlike volatilities, are lower than those for large cap stocks. For individuals, noise benefits trading stocks of smaller firms, while for institutional investors it its market width and depth that benefit trading stocks of larger firms. This distinct pattern of trading activity is not compatible with information-based explanation, especially why market width is lower, at market open, when trading is extremely heavy. Institutionals prefer to trade large cap stocks, especially at market close, while individuals are more eager to trade small caps at market open. So trading noise is just a specific transaction cost, as information cost, prominent only to certain investors in the market. If trading noise is not compatible with general market phenomena, then it may not be a general transaction cost as argued in Stoll (2000) . Trading noise is just another kind of specific cost, rather than a market-wide friction.
As we find trading brings friction, our findings provide support to the new financial transactions tax proposed by the European Union, which has invited lots of criticism. The results of this study also indicate that uneven trading noise makes market trading polarized. Transactions cost, rather than information dissemination, is the more important factor causing the result. Our study also helps identifying for various types of investors a more cost-efficient time to trade. Both individual and foreign institutional investors (FII's) in Taiwan bear relatively much lower general transaction cost caused by noise, especially at market open, when there is significantly intensive trading. But foreign institutional benefit more from trading at market close than at market open when trading does not concentrate. A brief literature review and discussion is given in Section II.
Data and empirical results are laid out in Section III. Conclusion is given in Section IV.
II. Noise and Trading
Trading noise has long been considered a crucial factor to asset returns. When market trading is more heavily concentrated, noise plays a more important role. Literature has modeled noise as investor irrationality or information barrier, among others. Although the direct effect of noise trading to a securities market seems to be reducing informational efficiency, there are views on the positive side of noise. Greater noise trading induces rational agents to trade more aggressively on their existing information and provides them with incentives to acquire better information. As a result, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Kyle (1985) , argue that noise trading does not reduce informational efficiency. Furthermore, Kyle (1985) suggests that noise trading improves informational efficiency.
Various models consider rational agents not being able to fully offset noise traders' demands because of limits to arbitrage. De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) indicate that rational arbitrageurs may magnify demand shocks from noise traders because anticipated worsening mispricing in the short-run. Relative to the issue of trading noise, Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) classify herding behavior into rational and irrational ones. Rational herding takes place when investors make the same response to a piece of information or when they exhibit similar preference for a stock, while irrational herding occurs as investors ignore their own information but imitate or follow others' trades. These views are not compatible with how noise trading is modeled.
Other than Kyle (1985) , many have also studied trading against one's own private information (e.g., Jarrow (1992), Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2004) ) in market manipulation, where the informed may trade in a wrong direction to increase noise in trading volume. Herding behavior is also considered a challenge to the efficient market paradigm. At a group level it is considered irrational as it leads to mispricing, but it can be rational at an individual level. Literature argues that the herding arises from agents copying one another in trading decisions. The models of BHW and Bannerjee (1992) consider that individuals make their decisions sequentially at a time, taking into account the decisions of the individuals preceding them. The model proposed by Cont and Bouchaud (2000) consider, instead of a sequential decision process, a random communication structure. Random interactions among agents lead to a heterogeneous market structure. AZ argues, on the other hand, that information cascades that induce herding will be short-lived and fragile as one contrarian trade from the herd can quickly stop an information cascade.
Noise and Information
Following the definition of Hu (2006) (1) where t m is considered as the permanent component of the stock price and follows a random walk process,
Where t u is a white noise and is orthogonal to 
will be used as a relative measure of noise within stock return volatility subsequently. When noise ratio of the entire market is computed, transactions price is used. But the midpoint of buy and sell order price is used in place of market price when noise ratio of a certain type of investor is to be computed. infrequent data sampling would lead to intra-interval herding being missed (at monthly, weekly, daily or even intra-daily intervals). For the purposes of our investigation we used the PS measure, which we consider the most suitable, since it overcomes this problem of intraday data. Constructed from intraday data, it has a major advantage of not assuming herding to vary with extreme market conditions, and considering the market as a whole rather than a just the institutional investors.
PS statistic measures herding intensity in terms of the number of runs. The bootstrapped runs test of PS uses run numbers of buy and sells orders 3 . As our data set contains identification of buy or sell orders, we would not need Lee and Ready (1991) and Finucane (2002) to determine directions of investors' trading directions. If traders engage in systematic herding, the statistic should take significantly negative values, since the actual number of runs will be lower than expected. The standardized and adjusted type i runs for stock j on day t in PS is defined as
Where i r is the actual number of type i runs (up runs, down runs or zero runs), n is the total number of trades executed on asset j on day t, ½ is a discontinuity adjustment parameter and i p is the probability of finding a type of run i. Under asymptotic conditions, the statistic ) , , ( t j i x has a normal distribution with zero mean and variance
So the herding intensity statistic is expressed as Table III gives the sizes of buy and sell orders, in lots of one thousand shares, for all days where herding is significant at 1%. The average order size at market close is much larger than in other periods. The ratios of average buy orders to average sell orders, for days when herding is significant at 1%, is slightly higher than for the entire period. Among investor types, buy-sell ratios are greater than 1 for all institutionals during days of herding. Looking further into the opening intervals, we find that overall buy-sell ratios during significant herding days are actually lower than the entire period. But for the closing interval, not only the ratios are generally higher than those in the opening interval, but those in significant herding days are also higher than in the entire period.
This pattern coincides with intraday trading noise, which rises from open to close. If we look at stocks in the top and bottom return deciles, the buy-sell ratios are, as expected, higher in the top return decile. In the bottom return decile, buy-sell ratios are in general smaller than 1. Buy-sell ratios in the closing intervals are uniformly higher, around 20%, than in the opening intervals. Even for the bottom return decile, there appears to be a stronger, about 24% in magnitude, buying force near market close than right after market open.
Market Width
Limit order book dispersion can describe the tightness of the book by examining how far apart from each other (or from the midquote) the limit orders are placed in the book. It can also be considered as the width of a market and it captures the execution price innovation expected by the limit order trader when he sacrifices demand of immediacy and instead provides liquidity to the market. w , the size of the corresponding buy or sell limit orders. For the whole market, transaction prices are used to compute the first price interval, while for each type of investors, average of buy and sell order price at each priority level is used instead. This dispersion, or market width, measure is designed to show how clustered or dispersed the limit orders are in the book. It measures how tightly the orders are placed to each other or how closely they are to the midquote. The higher the dispersion is, the less tight the book is, and the lower amount of liquidity the limit order book provides.
It is a well known fact in Taiwan that, due to funding liquidity, individual investors tend to hold and trade stocks with lower prices, while institutional investors concentrate more on high price stocks. 
Market Depth
Bloomfield, O'Hara, and Saar (2005) argue that informed traders would submit more limit orders than market orders in an electronic market. McKenzie (2007) argues that in the emerging markets especially the ability to forecast future price movements is related to the depth of those markets. Therefore, beside the tightness measure, limit order book helps examining how well the book handles large volume of market orders. A deep limit order book can absorb a sudden surge in the demand of liquidity without inducing much price deviation. Without the interference of the specialist and before new limit orders can replenish the book, market buy (sell) orders will first be executed against the limit sell (buy) orders at the best offer (bid) quote. If the volume of the market order(s) is larger than the best offer (bid) size, the remainder of the unexecuted market orders will be executed against the limit orders queuing at the next best offer (bid) quote. In other words, large volume of market buy (sell) orders will walk up (down) the limit order book to get filled. The further away the market orders walk up or down the book, the larger the difference between the execution price and the mid-quote is, and therefore the more costly the trading process will be for the market order traders. Motivated by the mechanism described above, we modify the market depth measure of Kang and Yeo (2008), which can be thought of as an enhanced depth measure for the limit order book.
where i=1,2,…,525. 
III. Data and empirical results
This study employs intra-day order book data from the Taiwan Stock Exchange starting from Among all types of investors, FII's exhibit the strongest herding behavior in the opening interval, followed by individuals and investment trusts. Herding of proprietary dealers is quite different from the other three types, peaking at mid-day sessions.
We report in Table IV In order to explore the effects of herding alone on noise in trading, we use the model below to see its influences. We perform a panel regression with generalized least squares random effect based
where N stands for noise as defined in (3), and H is defined according to (6) . Also, t=1,…,461 (for trading days) and k=1,…,525 (for stocks) . A greater β in magnitude implies stronger noise is produced by more intensive trading activity. Table V gives the result of this model, where a negative β estimate would indicates that trading activity brings in more trading noise, as herding measure summarized in Table II in general takes on negative values. For the entire observations, the magnitudes of coefficients in general peak at mid-day, with the closing interval having the weakest coefficient. If we narrow the observations down to only those with significant herding at 10%, the magnitudes of coefficients fall by 50%. When market opens, trading brings in the least amount of noise. In another word, although noise does rise with herding, but when herding is very strong, its influence on trading noise is actually smaller. When trading is not heavy, it affects noise more, but not otherwise. However, if MW is just a form of economic rent imposed by limit order traders to reflect the benefits each trader can enjoy through shorter search time.
According to Table VII, Along the direction of firm size, individuals' edge in order book depth at market open is 2.1 times on small cap and 2.3 times on large cap, but is 3.7 times and 2.7 times respectively at market close.
So the results on market depth measure in Table VII implies that it is in the interest of FII's and DII's to trade large cap stocks, especially at market close. For individuals, order book depth indicated they should make the similar trading decision as the institutional investors to avoid higher execution cost in trading small cap stocks at market open. However, the search cost advantage dominates the execution cost. Apparently, for individuals finding a counterparty to complete an intended trade is more important than walking up a few ticks on the limit order book and paying for a slightly higher transacted price. After all, not being able to submit a market order in the Taiwan market is itself a strong protection against shallow limit order book. Besides, there is also a 7% price limit on either direction. Actual trading intensity may depend in part on the relative strength of search and execution costs.
Based on a framework of time-size block, we show why intraday trading could actually result more friction in a market. The relation is, however, on the level of broad categories. 
IV. Conclusion
This study examines intra-day order book data to study whether trading activity incites or suppresses certain market friction, particularly when trading is heavy. We adopt a measure of trading concentration specifically ideal for high frequency data. The measure is not only constructed on a daily level, but also within intra-day time intervals. Trading concentration is found to bring in noise or friction to the market. As we find trading brings friction, our findings provide support to the new financial transactions tax proposed by the European Union, which has invited lots of criticism.
We have also introduced measures on width and depth of a limit order book to explain why market friction reacts to trading activity as we find it. We find strong evidences against the idea of trading noise being a general transaction cost, or a general friction in market trading. Specifically, trading noise behaves, and reacts to market width and depth, differently across investor type, market capitalization and time of day. Trading noise is just a specific transaction cost, as information cost, prominent at certain aspect in the market. In thousand shares where N stands for noise as defined in (3), and H is defined according to (6) . Also, t=1,…,461 (for trading days) and k=1,…,525 (for stocks) . A greater β in magnitude implies stronger noise is produced by more intensive trading activity.
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